



ANNUAL

REPORT - FIU - 2024



Financial Information Unit

Established by Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January





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INDEPENDÊNCIA
NACIONAL DE ANGOLA
1975-2025

Angola celebrates the 50th anniversary of its independence on 11 November 2025.

A milestone for reflection on the country's journey towards freedom, peace and progress. Under the slogan 'Angola 50 Years: Preserving and valuing the achievements made, building a better future,' these celebrations strengthen national pride and the unity of all Angolans and highlight historical achievements and future challenges

This is an opportunity to promote civic and community involvement, consolidating each citizen's commitment to Angola's development and prosperity.

'Angola 50 Years: Preserving and valuing achievements, building a better future'



CHAPTER - I

General Information

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1.1. Message from the Director General of the UIF

Dear readers, in fulfilment of our duties, we are honoured to present the UIF Annual Report on the activities carried out during 2024.

Although the year under review was particularly challenging, the high spirit of mission and the selfless commitment of our team allowed us to respond to the most pressing issues, without diminishing the fruitful collaboration of the Angolan authorities linked to the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we were able to respond to the most pressing issues.



Therefore, despite the fact that the national authorities were engaged in the Angola Mutual Evaluation process, it was possible to hold the 47th Meeting of the Task Force of Senior Experts of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) from 5 to 12 April. This event was an important milestone in the organisation's history, as the meeting of the ESAAMLG's senior experts in Lubango inaugurated the process of decentralising the April meetings of the region's Task Force, which were normally held in the city of Arusha in the United Republic of Tanzania.

In the same year, the Angolan authorities represented by the main institutions of the National PC-BC/FT/FP System, following the end of the observation period in September 2024, presented the Post-Observation Period Progress Report in Brussels. However, the FATF considered that the Angolan state needed to strengthen the National PC-BC/FT/FP System, and for this reason Angola was placed on the FATF's List of Jurisdictions Subject to Enhanced Monitoring for a period of two years in order to remedy the deficiencies identified.

As a consequence and in accordance with FATF procedures, following Angola's inclusion on the list of Countries Subject to Enhanced Monitoring, the Executive made a High Level Commitment to implement the Action Plan agreed between the Angolan authorities and the FATF International Co-operation and Review Group (ICRG) with the aim of correcting the remaining strategic deficiencies and ultimately strengthening the National PC-BC/FT/FP System.

In fact, it is worth mentioning that of the main results observed as a result of this commitment by the Angolan Executive, among others, we highlight the approval

of four (4) pieces of legislation (Laws) that were identified as having deficiencies in relation to the FATF Recommendations during the Mutual Evaluation, the strengthening of training and awareness-raising activities among the entities that make up the National PC-BC/FT/FP System and other relevant players in the field, in the provinces of Huambo, Bié, Uíge, Huíla, Lunda Sul, Cabinda and Cuanza Sul.

Likewise, always with a view to achieving organisational excellence, and with the aim of making the FIU ever more up-to-date, modern and aligned with good corporate governance practices, the plan is to continue investing in the FIU's physical and technological structure, improving ergonomic conditions, as well as the technical training of employees, in order to meet the ever-increasing challenges of the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, both from the point of view of internal management strategy and the process of restructuring the FIU.

With this in mind, I invite you to read this Annual Report, which demonstrates the collective work of the Financial Intelligence Unit during 2024. As we face the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead, I am confident that together we will continue to ensure a prompt response to the emerging crimes that arise at global speed in the financial markets and within the regional and global context.

Happy reading.

Gilberto Moisés Moma Capeça
Director General of the UIF

1.1.1. Regional and Global Context: BC/FT/FP

Countries in the region face significant challenges, including corruption, a lack of resources and the limited capacity of financial institutions. Organised crime and political instability in some nations also contribute to vulnerability to money laundering and terrorist financing, and the international landscape in relation to money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is complex and interconnected.

The ESAAMLG (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group) is an organisation that aims to strengthen the capacity of southern African countries to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by promoting the implementation of international standards, such as the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

ESAAMLG also promotes cooperation between member countries, encouraging the exchange of information and the harmonisation of national legislation. Collaboration with other regional and international organisations is key to responding promptly to financial crime.

At international level, the FATF plays a crucial role in setting standards and promoting effective measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions also address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, linking it to illicit financing.

Globalisation and the digitalisation of finance have created new opportunities for money laundering and terrorist financing. Cryptocurrencies and online payment platforms are growing areas of concern, as they have been used to hide illicit transactions.

The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing requires a collaborative approach. International organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, work together with countries to strengthen their capacities and implement best practices.

The relationship between the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing concern, mainly because the financing of terrorist groups can be facilitated by criminal networks operating in arms, drugs and other trafficking, making it essential to implement strict financial control measures.

Combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires an integrated approach involving both regional efforts and international initiatives. Cooperation between countries and organisations is key to tackling these challenges effectively and ensuring financial security and global stability.

1.1.2. Financing Terrorism

The financing of terrorism is a concern of the FATF, which, among other things, in Recommendation 5, recommends the need for states to criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and the financing of terrorist organisations and individuals, on the basis of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Recommendation instructs that criminalisation should occur even when there is no direct link to a specific terrorist act or acts.

In general terms, terrorist financing can be defined as the process of providing or collecting funds from legitimate or illegitimate sources with the intention that, or in the knowledge that, those funds are intended to be used to carry out any act of terrorism, whether or not those funds are actually used for the purpose in question.

In parallel to the use of money, terrorist financing can also involve facilitating terrorist acts, or supporting terrorists, using other assets or stores of value, such as:

- Natural resources, e.g. oil, gas, phosphate, precious metals, precious stones, wheat and grains;
- Properties;
- Legal documents;
- Financial instruments and items of archaeological, historical, cultural and religious importance.

Terrorist financing is a prerequisite for organised terrorist activity and as therefore represents a real threat to world peace and security.

Terrorist organisations generally need to move funds to:

- Carry out terrorist acts;
- Spread the ideology and recruit people to your cause;
- Paying for travel and transport;
- Buying arms, ammunition and supporting those involved, for example by providing food and accommodation for foreign terrorist fighters and their families and by financing terrorist cells.

In Angola, terrorist financing and related acts constitute criminal offences, as required by FATF Recommendation 5. Specific provisions related to these offences are observed both in Law no. 19/17, of 25 August - Law for the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism, amended by Law no. 9/24, of 3 July, in combination with the provisions of Law no. 5/20, of 27 January - Law for the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, amended by Law no. 11/24, of 4 July.

1.1.3. Stages of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing contrasts with other types of criminal activity where financial gain is generally the end goal. Furthermore, Recommendation 5 calls for this offence to also be considered as an underlying offence to Money Laundering.

Infographics no. 1



The process of financing terrorism is linear, and the money generated is used to facilitate terrorist activities through stages. Not all stages are necessary. Fundraising, for example, will be enough for terrorist financing to take place.

A. Fundraising

Fundraising is the set of actions (methods and channels) that individuals and/or entities linked directly or indirectly to terrorism use to obtain resources in order to finance terrorism.

Modern terrorist organisations, terrorist cells and individual terrorists employ various methods and channels to finance their operations, by way of example:

- Direct donations (salaries, social benefits, fundraising events, profits from legitimate commercial companies, prepaid cards, etc.);
- Use of charities and non-profit organisations (NGOs) (grants, diversion of charitable donations through affiliated individuals, fake NGOs);
- State sponsorship of terrorism;
- Proceeds of crime (extortion of local and diaspora populations and businesses, kidnapping for ransom, counterfeiting, cultural extortion, trafficking in drugs, people and organs, illicit businesses and other fraudulent activities such as subsidy abuse and tax exemption schemes);
- Solicitation on social media and crowd funding platforms (e.g. via mobile apps, chats, online funding platforms, e-wallets).

B. Movement of Resources

The movement of funds is the process by which resources raised by people, groups and organisations are moved for financing purposes.

Funds can be transferred using a variety of methods. For example:

- Banking and ATM transactions;
- Financial services companies (money

remittance and exchange providers);

- Internet-based payment services (e.g. Apple Pay, PayPal);
- Informal value transfer systems and bureaux de change;
- Smuggling money and other high-value goods, such as precious stones and antiques;
- Transfers of virtual assets.

C. Fund Storage

The storage of funds is the accumulation of resources with a view to their later use to unleash terrorist acts.

Some examples of methods used to store raised funds include:

- Banks and other financial accounts;
- Prepaid cards;
- Storing cash in large quantities;
- Art/antiques;
- Exploitation of natural resources (e.g. gas, oil, timber, diamonds, gold, wildlife, coal, precious stones);
- Virtual asset.

Monetary value can be initially stored in one form and subsequently converted into another.

For example, funds are paid out of a bank account, money is used to buy a work of art. The work of art can be an investment to protect against inflation.

In the future, they can be sold at a profit and the funds can be donated to various non-profit organisations. The funds can then be diverted to terrorist activities.

D. Fund Management

Fund management is the establishment of business relationships to maintain or increase resources that are earmarked for terrorist financing.

Terrorists can set up companies or hire professional services (bankers, accountants, estate agents, lawyers, investment houses,

creditors, trust company service providers, etc) to generate and manage investments, funds, the budget, etc.

E. Concealment of Funds

Concealment of funds is the action of hiding resources intended for terrorist financing from law enforcement authorities. Some examples of methods to conceal the origin or owner of funds include:

- Using third parties to stratify and complicate transaction tracking;
- Using intermediaries, for example putting money into bank accounts of sympathisers or third parties, these individuals not being known to law enforcement agencies;
- Using false names, for example, pretending to employ a person who doesn't exist, in reality paying the 'salary' to a terrorist organisation via an intermediary recipient.

F. Handling Funds

Terrorist organisations, terrorist cells and individual terrorists use funds in different ways. They are usually motivated by demands placed on them in the area where they operate.

For example, if a terrorist organisation or terrorist cell occupies a territory, it will need to ensure that funds are spent in this area, for example by paying its officers a salary to maintain checkpoints along access roads. They may also need to ensure that they can provide social services such as school, medical facilities and other 'public services' within the occupied territory.

• Terrorist Organisations

Terrorist organisations often spend substantial sums promoting their ideology, for example through social media campaigns and magazines. This gives them a certain seriousness and 'legitimacy'. They can attract funding and resources, such as money, weapons and/or foreign terrorist fighters.

In order to operate undisturbed in a territory, terrorist organisations pay bribes. Sometimes they buy land and buildings for training camps. They can also pay for social services, such as providing wages and accommodation for their leadership, veterans, foreign terrorist fighters and the families of those who died for the cause.

Terrorist organisations can also pay for sponsorship, such as start-up capital, for new terrorist cells or for attacks to be carried out in their name

• Terrorist cells

Terrorist cells can pay for training and expertise, as well as weapons and ammunition. They can also pay for the living expenses of their members. Sometimes they pay for transport costs and travelling expenses. Other times, they may also send money to their affiliated terrorist organisation. It is not common for cell members to self-finance their activities.

• Individual Terrorists

Individual terrorists may occasionally receive sponsorship from a terrorist organisation or cell. More commonly, they self-finance their activities. They use funds for purposes similar to those of a terrorist cell.

1.1.4. Terrorist Property vs. Criminal Property

There are differences between terrorist property and criminal property that can make it difficult to identify terrorist property. For example:


- The funds may be obtained legally and may be of low value, but they are used for an illegal activity - terrorist financing;
- Along the way, the funds can be used to legitimately purchase regular products and services, such as

renting vehicles or buying common household goods;

- International cases of terrorist financing show that Non-Profit Organisations are vulnerable to abuse. Examples include the establishment of non-governmental organisations to attract funds from various sources through crowd-funding, social media and collection buckets.

Terrorists can use money laundering techniques to evade attention and protect the identity of their sponsors and the final beneficiaries of the funds raised, as shown below.

Infographic no. 2



Both illicit and legitimate sources of funds can therefore be relevant. The use of new technologies, such as the internet, social media, cryptography, mobile technologies and blockchain, has broadened the available

methods and channels of terrorist financing. Traditional payment methods are also vulnerable

1.1.5. Involvement in Terrorist Financing

The scope of monitoring potential terrorist financing activity extends beyond the terrorist act itself to any involvement in any way in any terrorist activity or terrorist entity, directly or indirectly, regardless of whether funds are being sent or not.

Various forms of involvement in terrorist activities include, but are not limited to:

- Engaging in, or being responsible for providing support for, the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism;
- Facilitating, promoting or encouraging terrorism;
- Providing or receiving training for terrorist purposes;
- Recruiting for terrorism, soliciting funds or otherwise obtaining funds, organising, providing support or otherwise facilitating the travel costs of foreign terrorist fighters or other terrorists;
- Being responsible for coercive action against a person in the name of, or on behalf of, a terrorist organisation.

Supervised persons, including professionals such as lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, lenders and others, are exposed to the risk of involvement in the financing of terrorist activities in any way and in any place. Examples of such involvement include, but are not limited to:

- Provision of financial services;
- Provision of economic resources;
- Obtaining funds or other economic resources;
- Facilitating the financing of travel, recruitment and advertising;
- Money laundering for terrorist purposes.

Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorist Financing

Targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing restrict designated persons from having access to funds or assets made available to them and require the freezing of all existing funds and assets that could be used by designated persons.

[Find out more.](#)



1.2. About the UIF

1.2.1. Introduction to UIF

The FATF promotes international standards and effective application of the legal, regulatory and operational measures necessary to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system and issues recommendations aimed at preventing and prosecuting these crimes, promotes mutual evaluation of compliance with these standards, determines countermeasures with regard to jurisdictions with relevant deficiencies and identifies new risks and methodologies for combating these criminal activities.

According to the FATF, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a government institution created to act as an interface between the financial and non-financial sectors and law enforcement agencies; with the competence to receive, to analyse, to disseminate information essentially on suspicious financial transactions relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is an intergovernmental body that aims to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

1.2.2. Institutionalising the FIU

The FIU was created in order to align itself with the recommendations of this highly reputable international organisation, thus becoming a cooperating nation in line with global best practice in preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as defined in FATF Recommendation 29, which calls on countries to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).



1.3. Main Milestones

2010

- Angola is included on the FATF blacklist. It is considered a non-cooperative jurisdiction;
- The Angolan government makes a political commitment to adjust the country's legislation and institutions to the FATF's recommendations, creating its system for preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing;
- Law 12/10, the first Law to Prevent and Combat Money Laundering, is passed;
- Angola begins the process of quarterly evaluation by the FATF-FATF, through the ICRG, in order to fulfil the strategic plan presented to the FATF;
- Angola moves from the FATF black list to the FATF grey list.

2011

- Angola is admitted as an Observer member of the ESAAMLG in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania;
- Experts from the World Bank and ESAAMLG are coming to the country to 'nini loco' assess the state of the country's compliance with the FATF's 40+9 recommendations.
- Drawing up the MER - Mutual Evaluation Report.

2012

- At the 23rd expert meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, the ESAAMLG expert group approved the mutual evaluation report of the Republic of Angola;
- In Maputo-Mozambique, at the 12th Meeting of the ESAAMLG Council of Ministers, Angola was admitted as a full member of the organisation;
- Law 1/12 on International Legal Acts is approved.

2013

- Angola's Financial Information Unit has applied to join the Egmont Group;
- The UIF of Angola receives a visit from a mission of the Egmont group in order to 'in loco' verify its conditions for admission as a full member of that Organisation;
- Presidential Decrees Approved:
 - 212/13 - Amends the Statutes of the UIF;
 - 214/13 - Approves the Regulation to Law 1/12.

2014

- The Angola Financial Intelligence Unit has been admitted as a full member of the Egmont Group - Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
- Angola hosts meeting of ESAAMLG Experts and Council of Ministers; and assumes presidency of ESAAMLG:
 - 2014 - Law 2/14 approved;
 - 2014 - Law 3/14 approved;
- Laws passed:
 - 2/14 - Search and Seizure Act.

2015

- Law 13/15 - law on international co-operation in criminal matters approved.

2016

- After five (5) years of being monitored by the FATF, Angola has been removed from the lists of countries under enhanced monitoring due to the fact that it has an efficient system for preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

2017

- Start of the National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Angola.

2018

- Presidential Decree no. 2/18 of 11 January establishing the new statute of the UIF approved;
- Angola's first money laundering trial begins;
- First study on the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in the NGO sector, carried out by IPROCAC and UIF;
- Start of work with the IMF to update Law no. 34/11, of 12 December - Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law..

2019

- Finalisation of the National Risk Assessment;
- First two convictions for the offence of money laundering in Angola.

2020

- The first nationwide Awareness Programme on BC/FT/FP in the city of Huambo;
- Preparing for the Angola Mutual Evaluation - Report and Questionnaires on technical compliance and the diagnosis of effectiveness;
- Updating the ANR report with data from 2018-2020;
- Law no. 05/20, the new Law on Preventing and Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, is approved.

2021

- Amendment of Article 36 of Presidential Decree no. 2/18, giving the Minister of State for Economic Coordination the power to coordinate the Supervisory Committee, replacing the Minister of the Interior, and also bringing the Minister of the Economy onto the Committee.
- Creation of the Technical Group to monitor Angola's Mutual Evaluation process, by Order of the Minister of State for Economic Coordination, as coordinator of the Supervisory Committee.
- ESAAMLG country preparation training for Angola's Mutual Evaluation process.
- Start of the Angola Mutual Evaluation process, with the UIF as coordinator of the inter-ministerial working group set up to answer MER questions.
- As part of the national awareness-raising workshops, the UIF held this event in Benguela province.

2022

- As part of the national awareness-raising workshops, the UIF held these events in the provinces of Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene and Namibe;
- It should be noted that the training sessions were aimed at law enforcement bodies, namely: the Courts, the Attorney General's Office (PGR), the National Criminal Investigation Service (SIC), the General Tax Administration (AGT), the External Intelligence Service (SIE), the State Intelligence and Security Service (SINSE), the Foreign Migration Service (SME), the National Police (PN), the Angolan Bar Association (OAA) and commercial banks.
- The first on-site visit by the ESAAMLG team of evaluators for the Angola Mutual Evaluation process took place.

2023






- 2nd visit by ESAAMLG assessors;
- Publication of the MER;
- Approval of the first UIF strategic plan.

2024

- Post Observation Period Report;
- ESAAMLG Senior Experts Meeting;
- Angola on the FATF's List of Countries Under Enhanced Monitoring;
- Law no. 09/24, 03 July - Law Amending Law no. 19/17, 25 August, on Preventing and Combating Terrorism;
- Law no. 10/24, of 03 July - Law Amending Law no. 13/15, of 19 June, on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters;
- Law no. 11/24, of 04 July - Law Amending Law no. 5/20, of 27 January, on Preventing and Combating ML/TF/PF;
- Law no. 12/24 of 04 July - Law Amending the Angolan Penal Code, approved by Law no. 38/20 of 11 November.

1.4. Highlights of 2024

Infographics no. 3



1.4.1. Administrative FIU

In order to better fulfil its objectives associated with the prevention and repression of money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of weapons of mass destruction, the Angolan executive opted to establish an administrative UIF in the country. It should be emphasised that UIFs can be of three types:

- Administrative;
- Police; and
- Hybrids.

The FIU is responsible to receive, to analyse, to disseminate transactions suspected of money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of weapons of mass destruction at national level. Our FIU has no investigative or prosecutorial powers and acts as an interface between the financial sector, entities and professionals subject to reporting obligations and the bodies responsible for law enforcement, investigations and prosecutions of financial crimes.

In addition to its main function to analyse and monitoring, the FIU is also in charge of supervision and oversight within the scope of preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as set out in chapter 5.d of article 3 of Law no. 5/20.

1.5. Mission, Role, Vision and Values

Infographics no. 4




1.6. Organisational Structure

The Financial Information Unit (FIU) has a functional organisational structure that objectively defines the responsibilities, competences and functions of the units that make it up, as can be seen in the graphic representation below:

1.6.1. FIU organisation chart

Infographics no. 5



1.6.2. Composition of the Organisational Structure

The organisational structure of the UIF is made up of the following organic units:

- General Management;
- Board of Directors;
- Office of the Director-General;
- Analysis and Typologies Department;
- Monitoring and Legal Department;
- Department of Co-operation and Institutional Communication;
- Information Technology Department; and,
- Administration and Finance Department.

The various departments of the UIF are made up of divisions.

1.6.3. Functions of the Organisational Units



General Management

The body responsible for the administrative and operational management of the FIU, autonomously and independently.



Board of Directors

This statutory body was set up to provide support to the Director General of the UIF in terms of programming and organising the institution. The permanent members of this body are the Director General, Deputy Director General and Heads of Departments. Internally, the management of this body is endorsed by its own regulations.

The UIF Governing Board represents the Directorate General's commitment to adopting good corporate governance practices and to guaranteeing inclusive and participatory management, fundamentally in strategic and operational decision-making. The Governing Board is also responsible for providing support in overseeing the activities of the FIU, as well as ensuring that day-to-day operations are carried out in accordance with the defined objectives and established values.



General Manager's Support Office

It is the body responsible for providing support to the Director General of the UIF in a variety of matters such as strategic planning, internal control, communication, public relations and protocol, among others. The main aim of this office is to ensure that the Director General has the support he needs to carry out his duties effectively and to contribute to the success of the organisation as a whole.



Analysis and Typologies Department

It is the organic unit responsible for ensuring the effective internal repression of money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the advantages of any offences underlying these crimes, by receiving, collecting, processing and disseminating reports of suspicious operations at national and international level. It is also responsible for supporting the Directorate General in defining the CB/TB/FP strategy, managing statistics and drawing up typology studies.



Monitoring and Legal Department

The Department is responsible for ensuring the implementation of a set of preventive measures in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), i.e. mitigating the risk of money laundering offences, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through monitoring, supervision and awareness-raising that contribute to uniting and strengthening the national system. On the other hand, it supports the General Directorate of the FIU in legal matters and in participating in the design of legislation within the scope of ML/TF and in the fulfilment of recommendations related to the requirements established for designations.



Department of Cooperation and Institutional Communication

It carries out its duties by promoting co-operation with national, similar and international institutions in order to strengthen the exchange of information and other relevant information for better institutional performance. It is the department responsible for managing all institutional communication and maintaining the image of the Financial Information Unit, keeping it up to date and in line with its purpose.



Information Technology Department

The Information Technology Department is responsible for implementing and managing the institution's information systems, such as networks, computers, technical support, software development, information management, information systems security, electronic security and cyber security. It represents an organic unit with a crucial role in supporting the UIF's core business operations and ensuring that it is used effectively to achieve the organisation's objectives.



Administration and Finance Department

The organisational unit responsible for managing the financial and administrative operations of the UIF, it includes activities such as accounting, cash flow management, financial reporting, budget planning, human capital management and the institution's assets. The Administrative and Finance Department plays a fundamental role in strategic decision-making, supporting the UIF's day-to-day operations and ensuring compliance with current tax legislation.

The various Organic Units of the Financial Information Unit are governed administratively and operationally on a daily basis by the Administrative Organisation Manuals (MOA).

The MOA is a document that defines how the organisational structure (Organigram) is represented graphically, and also describes the hierarchical dependencies, functions, responsibilities and staffing required for the efficient and effective functioning of the areas and consequently of the institution.



1.6.4. Value Chain


The value chain is a key tool for the Financial Intelligence Unit, because it ensures an understanding of how the institution works and how it adds value to Angolan society in the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. On the other hand, it makes it possible to analyse and optimise each stage of the organisation, thereby increasing its efficiency, reducing costs and offering services that better meet the expectations related to the UIF's mission.

The UIF's value chain is made up of 3 (three) groups of macro-processes, namely:

1. Management Macroprocesses (primary);
2. Business Macroprocesses; and
3. Support Macroprocesses.

The composition of the UIF value chain is shown below.

Infographics no. 6



1.7. UIF 2024 Summary

Infographics no. 7

Internal Organisation

1-General Manager;
1-Deputy General Manager;
1-Board of Directors;
5-Departments;
1-Office;
14-Divisions.

Technical Board

2% - Doctor;
16% - Masters;
16% - Postgraduates;
52% - Graduates;
6% - University
Attendance.

Staff by Organisational Unit

DGE - 2;
EAT - 12;
EAF - 16;
EMJ - 8;
ECI - 6;
ETI - 4;
GAD - 6.

Strategic Vision

5 Strategic Pillars;
18 Strategic Objectives;
52 Strategic Initiatives.

Proposed Suspension of Operations

AKZ: 748 869 799,55;
USD: 1 000 176 055,00;
EUR: 864 078,84.

Suspicious Operations Reports

2 742 - DOS;
4 - DIPDs;
142 818 - DTNs;
76 - EC Received;
17 - EC issued;
167 Widespread.

Enquiries

283 National and
International Received;
64 National and
International Sent.

MOUs

3 Memorandum
of Understanding
and Exchanges of
Information.

Training and Awareness Raising

7 Sensitisations;
3 Trainings;
3 Workshops.



CHAPTER - II

Evaluation of

Angola



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Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures

Angola

Mutual Evaluation Report

June 2023

2.1. Evaluation Process of Angola's PC-BC/FT/FP System

Our country's mutual evaluation process began in October 2021. The main objective was to assess the compliance of our regulatory framework and its effectiveness against the FATF's international standards on BC/FT/FP.

In July 2023, Angola was placed on a 12-month Observation Period following the adoption of the Mutual Evaluation Report the previous month.

Thus, on 25 October 2024, the FATF Plenary, meeting in Paris, Republic of France, decided to approve the Action Plan proposed by the ICRG Joint Group for Africa, after consulting the global community, resulting from the remaining deficiencies in Angola's Mutual Evaluation Report, which were to be remedied over the course of the one-year observation period, which lasted from 4 July 2023 to 4 July 2024.

This approval follows the discussion of the Post-Observation Period Progress Report in September 2024, in which the ICRG Joint Group for Africa concluded that of the 87 Recommended Actions, the Angolan state had managed to resolve a total of 70 deficiencies, having reduced the initial 87 to 17 deficiencies, some of which are considered strategic (listed in the Action Plan) and require further progress.

As a result, Angola was placed on the Enhanced Monitoring List in order to be able to resolve the remaining strategic deficiencies, despite the FATF having recognised the significant progress

made since 2023 in some areas for the effective prevention and combat of money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other associated crime.

The Angolan Executive reiterates its high-level commitment, shared officially with the President of the FATF, Dr Elisa de Anda Madrazo, to comply with the Action Plan outlined within the two-year period (2025/2027) established in order to guarantee a national system for preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that is increasingly effective and in line with international best practice.

Without prejudice to these deadlines, the Angolan government has committed itself to prioritising a series of strategic actions which, due to their impact on economic and financial activity, must be implemented in the shortest possible time. This is the case with implementing risk-based supervision in the financial and non-financial sectors, carrying out thematic, sectoral and national risk assessment exercises, strengthening the technical and professional capacity of Angolan staff in terms of Preventing and Combating ML/TF/FP and other strategic measures, as well as other measures included in the Action Plan.

The Angolan Executive remains confident in the fruitful co-operation with the FATF/ESAAMLG for the effective achievement of the shared common objectives in Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.



2.2. International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG)

The International Cooperation Review Group is responsible for monitoring and assessing countries or jurisdictions that are not in compliance with the FATF's recommendations on preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

This group, through the significant and strategic deficiencies that countries have in their systems, recommends and monitors the actions that should be implemented to improve these systems.

The purpose of this group is to encourage international co-operation and the implementation of best practices around the world to strengthen the integrity of the global financial system.

2.2.1. High Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions

Global security mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are robust, regardless of individual jurisdictions' measures.

However, criminals can circumvent weak PC-BC/FT/FP controls to successfully launder or move assets to finance terrorism through the financial system.

A key objective of the FATF is to continually identify jurisdictions with significant weaknesses in their PC-BC/FT/FP regimes and work with them to address those weaknesses.

The FATF process helps protect the integrity of the international financial system by issuing a public warning about the risks emanating from the identified jurisdictions.

These public warnings also put pressure on the identified jurisdictions to address their weaknesses in order to maintain their position in the global economy.

Public identification and the prospect of public identification incentivise countries to make significant improvements quickly.

2.2.2. Review Process

The FATF continuously identifies and reviews jurisdictions with strategic CB/TCF/PF deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system and closely monitors their progress.

The FATF's International Cooperation and Review Group (ICRG) oversees the process. This process began in 2007 and was refined in 2009. It was updated in 2015 to take into account the FATF's revised Recommendations and processes, which assess the effective implementation of PC-BC/FT/FP measures.

The FATF reviews jurisdictions based on specific threats, vulnerabilities or risks arising from the jurisdiction. Specifically, a jurisdiction will be reviewed when:

1. Does not participate in a FATF-style regional body (FSRB) or does not allow the results of the mutual evaluation to be published in a timely manner; or
2. Is nominated by a FATF member or an FSRB. The referral is based on specific risks or threats of money laundering, terrorist financing or financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that come to the attention of delegations; or
3. Has obtained very low results in its mutual evaluation, specifically:
 - It has 20 or more non-compliant (NC) or partially compliant (PC) ratings for technical compliance; or
 - It has 20 or more non-compliant (NC) or partially compliant (PC) ratings for technical compliance; or
 - Has a low or moderate level of effectiveness for 9 or more of the 11 immediate outcomes, with a minimum of two low; or
 - Has a low level of effectiveness for 6 or more of the 11 outcomes.

A jurisdiction that enters the ICRG review process as a result of its mutual evaluation rating has a one-year Observation Period to work with the FATF or its FATF-style regional body (FSRB) to address deficiencies prior to possible public identification and formal review by the FATF.

The FATF then prioritises the review of countries with the most significant financial sectors - for example, \$5 billion or more in financial sector assets.

During the review process, the FATF considers the PC-BC/FT/FP strategic deficiencies identified in terms of both technical compliance and the effectiveness of the measures in place, and any relevant progress made by the jurisdiction.

If the FATF considers the progress insufficient to address the strategic deficiencies, the FATF develops an action plan with the jurisdiction to address the remaining strategic deficiencies.

For all countries under ICRG review, the FATF requires a high-level political commitment that the jurisdiction will implement the legal, regulatory and operational reforms required by the action plan.

For all countries under ICRG review, the FATF requires a high-level political commitment that the jurisdiction will implement the legal, regulatory and operational reforms required by the action plan.

2.2.3. Public Identification

The FATF publishes two statements at the end of each plenary meeting, in February, June and October. These statements provide a brief summary of recent actions taken in accordance with each jurisdiction's action plan, as well as a list of strategic deficiencies yet to be addressed. The two statements reflect different levels of risk presented by deficiencies in jurisdictions under review.

2.2.4. Jurisdictions Under Increased Monitoring

Jurisdictions under enhanced monitoring work actively with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

When the FATF places a jurisdiction under enhanced monitoring, it means that the country has committed itself to swiftly resolving the identified strategic deficiencies within the agreed deadlines.

2.2.5. High Risk Jurisdictions

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For all countries identified as high risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence and, in the most serious cases, countries are called on to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing risks of money laundering, terrorist financing and financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction emanating from the country. This list is often referred to externally as the 'blacklist'.

2.2.6. Removal from the FATF's Enhanced Monitoring List

To be removed from FATF monitoring, a jurisdiction must address all or almost all of the components of its action plan.

Once the FATF has determined that a jurisdiction has done so, it will organise an on-site visit to confirm that implementation of the necessary legal, regulatory and/or operational reforms is underway and that there is the necessary political commitment and institutional capacity to sustain implementation. If the on-site visit has a positive outcome, the FATF will decide on the removal of the jurisdiction from public identification at the next FATF plenary.

The jurisdiction in question will then continue to work within the FATF or the relevant FSRB, through its normal follow-up process, to improve its PC-BC/FT/FP regime.

2.3. List of Jurisdictions Under Enhanced FATF Monitoring

One of the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) many mechanisms for combating money laundering and terrorist activities is the List of Jurisdictions Under Enhanced Monitoring.

Countries on this list are considered to have strategic deficiencies in their PC-BC/FT/FP system. Being on the list of Jurisdictions Under Enhanced Monitoring means that a country has not implemented sufficient measures to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing offences in relation to FATF standards.

The FATF List of Jurisdictions under Enhanced Monitoring is a list of countries with strategic deficiencies in their existing regulatory framework and its application. These countries are placed under enhanced monitoring and more frequent reviews by the FATF until they recognise these deficiencies and work on them. Being on this list implies that a country is expected to address the deficiencies and is subject to FATF scrutiny until it shows some sufficient improvement.

The FATF maintains two separate lists regarding BC/FT/FP deficiencies, namely jurisdictions under 'enhanced monitoring' that are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes. Under enhanced monitoring, jurisdictions commit to swiftly addressing the strategic deficiencies identified in their regime to combat ML/TF/PF within agreed deadlines by actively working with the FATF.

Furthermore, the FATF does not require enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. Instead, the FATF requires the application of a risk-based approach, encouraging its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the jurisdiction's information on enhanced monitoring in their Risk analysis, Angola being on this list;

The FATF publishes the List of Jurisdictions under Enhanced Monitoring three times a year, and it is possible for these lists to change, and jurisdictions to be added or removed from the list based on FATF scrutiny.

By placing a country on the list of Jurisdictions under Enhanced Monitoring, the FATF provides an opportunity for that country to make its AML/CTF/CTF framework sound and robust and thus aims to strengthen the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The map below illustrates the geographical distribution at continental level.


2.3.1. Countries on the Enhanced Monitoring List

The FATF is the main organisation fighting money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The list of Countries under Enhanced Monitoring acts as a backstop and requires a jurisdiction to reform its regulatory framework. This list is a tool that encourages accountability and promotes transparency and integrity in the global financial system.


The countries on the Enhanced Monitoring List are:

Infographics no. 10



Geographical Distribution of Countries on the FATF Enhanced Monitoring List by Continent

Infographics no. 9





CHAPTER - III

FIU Activities

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3.1. Our Team

In today's global context, it is increasingly necessary to transform Human Capital into a strategic partner, aligning it with the organisation's culture and objectives, with a view to achieving a prosperous and sustainable future in line with the established strategic vision, the Financial Information Unit considers its Human Capital to be the main success factor and the driving force for achieving its existential purpose.


The institution has intensified its investment in training, seminars and workshops which have served to improve employee engagement by developing leadership techniques based on resilience and a good working environment. In 2024, a set of policies was also approved to make Human Capital management more efficient, thus consolidating the strengthening of the Financial Information Unit's organisational culture.

3.3.1. Composition of the UIF Team


The UIF team in 2024 consisted of 53 workers.

In terms of gender, the number of male employees continues to be higher at 28, representing 53 per cent of the total workforce. The female gender currently represents less than 50 per cent, or 47 per cent of the total workforce.

Infographics no. 11




Infographics no. 12



3.2. Staff by Organisational Unit

The staff of the FIU is divided among the organic units as follows:



Infographics no.13

Range of Ages

The average age of the FIU in 2024 was 41 years old, compared to 2023, the team aged by one year. However, they are still considered young adults. As for the range of ages, the lowest was 25, while the highest was 61.

Infographics no. 14

Underage

The lowest age of the UIF in 2024 was 25 years.

Age

The highest age of the UIF in 2024 was 61 years old.


Middle Ages

The average age of the FIU in 2024 was 41 years old.

3.2.1. Academic Level

The UIF offers a wide variety of training programmes. As far as academic levels are concerned, it has the following levels:


Infographics no. 15




3.3. Collecting, Analysing and Disseminating Suspicious Operations Reports

3.3.1. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prosecutions

Infographics no. 16




Infographics no. 17



3.3.2. Types of Suspicious Transaction Reports

In the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the information provided by the institutions subject to the FIU is crucial to providing the Law Enforcement Agencies with sufficient elements to initiate investigations into suspected crimes committed, as well as to subsidise ongoing investigations.


3.3.3. Suspicious Transaction Handling Process



Thus, suspicious transaction reports (DOS) and other disclosures are submitted to the FIU electronically or by physical means. The process of collecting statistics is continuous and aims to fulfil recommendation 33.

Thus, in 2024, the FIU collected a series of statistics fuelled by the communications reported by the Affected Entities and their Supervisors.

The National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is made up of Supervisory Bodies, Supervisory Bodies and Affected Entities:



3.3.4. Generic Suspicion Indicators


Organisations must pay attention to a set of suspicion indicators (generic and specific) that allow them to assess the risk involved in the relationship with their clients and in transaction processes.

The Identification of Suspicion Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ML/TF) Risk is intended to help the entities subject to the tax to observe business relationships and/or occasional transactions more closely, to identify elements that indicate suspicion and to assess the risks of a transaction.

This is not an exhaustive list, but merely an example of situations that may constitute suspicion indicators, which are a good starting tool for each subject entity to create its own suspicion indicators, adapted to its operational reality.

Suspicion indicators are patterns of action or behaviour, schemes which, when observed, lead us to consider the hypothesis that the crime of money laundering, terrorist financing, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or another underlying crime has taken place or is in progress or may take place. These indicators are the result of observing various movements and behaviours in different specific situations.

The indicators can be grouped by area of activity or branch of activity, as shown below:




3.3.5. Suspicious Operations Reporting Statistics


Transparency in the FIU's activities is fundamental to strengthening public trust and promoting effective co-operation between regulators, financial and non-financial institutions, as well as other strategic partners. In this context, the detailed disclosure of suspicious transaction reports received and investigated plays a crucial role.

Below is a summary of the reports received in 2024 based on the different tools the FIU has:

Media Receipts	Types of Communications	2021	2022	2023	2024
Physical & Email	DOS	858	742	538	771
	DIPDs	6	2	3	4
GoAML		0	0	331	1968
Total		864	744	873	2742



Types of Entities	Statistics of DOS	
	GoAML	Physical and Email
Financial Sector	1801	702
Non-Financial Sector and Other Entities	167	69
Total	1968	771



During 2024, the Financial Intelligence Unit received a total of 2742 suspicious transaction reports (DOS and DIPDs). Continuing the growth in the behaviour of this variable, as occurred last year, in 2024 the FIU recorded a considerable exponential increase in DOS and DIPDs received. This was due to the use of the GoAML platform, which enabled more institutions to be registered and consequently more information produced by them to be shared. Communications received via GoAML accounted for more than 70 per cent of all communications received, with commercial banks leading the way among the institutions that report the most to the FIU, with more than 90 per cent of all communications reported.

During this period, the FIU monitored the process of designating the respective sanctions lists and disseminated 17 (seventeen) UN sanctions lists and the respective press releases from designated persons and entities:

- Receipt, analysis and dissemination of 5 (five) additions to the UN sanctions lists;
- Receipt, analysis and dissemination of 3 (three) deletions (removal) from the UN sanctions lists; and,
- Receipt, analysis and dissemination of 9 (nine) extensions to the UN sanctions lists.



3.4. Spontaneous Communications Statistics

As part of the co-operation between national and international institutions, the Financial Information Unit received a total of 76 Spontaneous Communications (SC) in 2024, as described in the table below:

Year	EC of National Institutions		EC of International Institutions	
	Received	Sent	Received	Sent
2021	49	136	18	8
2022	20	65	1	7
2023	39	18	44	0
2024	45	17	31	0


3.5. Analysing and Processing Suspicious Transaction Reports (DOS)

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), at the forefront of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, has made remarkable progress in to analyse cases and the results of investigations. The ability to intervene effectively in these matters is crucial to ensuring the integrity of the financial system and protecting the national economy. Below is a description of the results of the investigations carried out, which emphasise the effectiveness of the FIU's interventions

Widespread Suspicious Communications

Figure 22 reflects the dissemination of the DOS, DIPD and EC sent to the Law Enforcement Agencies in 2024.

Infographics no. 21



In 2024, the Financial Intelligence Unit disseminated a total of 167 suspicious transaction reports to law enforcement agencies.

Disseminated Communications Statistics

Type of Communications	Disseminated Communications
Suspicious Transaction Statements	134
Designated Persons Identification Statements	2
Spontaneous Communications (National and International)	31
Total	167


3.6. Proposals for Suspension of Suspicious Transactions

For 2024, the FIU received a total of 22 DOS (physical/email) with suspension requests, 21 from the financial sector (commercial banks) and 1 from the non-financial sector. Of the 22 requests for suspension, we received six (6) confirmations from the law enforcers that suspicious transactions had been authorised.

The amounts traded in suspicious transaction requests are as follows:

Types of Sector	Proposals to Suspend Suspicious Transactions			
	Total Suspension Requests	KZ	USD	EUR
Financial Sector	21	746 956 799,55	1 000 176 055,00	864 079,94
Non-Financial Sector	1	1 913 000,00		
Total	22	748 869 799,55	1 000 176 055,00	864 078,94

3.7. Nationality of Persons Involved in Suspicious Operations



Nationality	Total		
Angolan	409		
Vietnamese	14		
Chinese	88		
Lebanese	11		
Eritrea	34		
Guinean	6		
Mauritanian	10		
Nigerian	4		
Israeli	1		
Indiana	3		
Russian	5		
Portuguese	9		
Somali	1		
Cuban	3		
Brazilian	1		
German	1		
Ethiopian	3		
Gambian	2		
Guinean	4		
Kenyan	2		
Turkish	1		
Leonese	1		
Grand Total	613		
		Other	Total
		Enterprises	152
		Total	152

It is also important to report on the nationalities of the citizens involved in the DIPDs communicated by commercial banks during 2024:

Nationality	Total
Lebanese	1
Mauritanian	1
Leonese	1
Spaniard	1

3.8. Cash Transaction Declaration (CTD) statistics

In accordance with article 17(2) and (3) of Law 05/20 - Law on Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (BC/FT/FP), the Financial Information Unit received cash transaction declarations (DTNs) totalling AKZ142,818,000 (One Hundred Forty Two Million Eight Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Kwanzas) from the banking and non-banking financial sectors during 2024, declarations of cash transactions (DTNs) totalling an amount equivalent to AKZ142 818 000 (One Hundred and Forty-Two Million Eight Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Kwanzas), registering an increase in the behaviour of this variable, changing the significant reduction seen in previous years.


Types of Sector	Cash Transactions (DTN's)			
	2021	2022	2023	2024
Commercial Banks	214 703	149 771	139 306	142 818

3.9. Indicators of Suspicious Communications

Suspicious of crimes give rise to indicators of suspicion, which are identified in the context of the dissemination of cases, taking into account the suspicions of crimes underlying money laundering identified in the various communications analysed and duly disseminated. Based on the results or illicit practices identified within the scope of the disseminations, the tendencies and/or modus operandi of the possible criminals are assessed, with a view to proposing the preparation of typology studies.

Figure 22 shows the offences underlying money laundering identified in the disseminations sent to the Law Enforcement Agencies in 2024.

Infographics no. 22



3.10. Information Systems and Technologies

The IT infrastructure plays a strategic role in the FIU, given the importance of the financial information processed and the need for security and availability of services. In this context, the activities described here are intended to contribute to the continuous optimisation of the FIU's technological environment.

Given the highly sensitive and confidential nature of the information produced by the FIU, it is essential to implement secure technological solutions to protect it. The integration of technology with the Information Security support function is crucial to meeting all IT needs, keeping the critical infrastructure functional and ensuring that all security measures are rigorously applied. This ensures that all systems are properly maintained, regularly updated, and that all related protocols are properly established and in place.

Obtaining quality reports of suspicious operation reports is crucial, as the quality of the reports received influences the production of intelligence through more in-depth analyses of the information received.

Thus the computerised system designed to report suspicious activities in the field of money laundering and terrorist financing, developed by UNODC, (GOAML), continues to be the aid mechanism in the process of receiving and processing reports of suspicious operations.

The registration and ongoing training of organisations directly involved in this process is therefore compulsory, and for 2024 training and refresher courses have been organised for the following sectors:

Type of Institution	2023	2024
Banks	5	1
Casinos	1	2
Securities Correction Agencies	1	0
Furniture Funds	1	0
Insurers	8	4
Insurance Brokers	1	0
Supervisors	3	1
Other Entities	9	14
Banks	5	1
Casinos	1	2
Total	35	25

In the current context, characterised by rapid technological developments and growing global interconnectivity, the PC-BC/FT/FP system faces unprecedented challenges.

The ability to adapt and anticipate trends is therefore essential for effective strategies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), aware of this panorama, has developed a critical and in-depth analysis of trends through the communications received, with the aim of formulating reports on trends and patterns related to money laundering and terrorist financing.



CHAPTER - IV

National and International Co-operation

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4.1. Cooperation and exchange of information

Effectiveness in preventing and combating CBT/CFT depends more and more on the ability to co-operate and share information at a global level. The FIU has strengthened its cooperation network by sharing information with its counterparts, signing protocols and actively participating in international and bilateral forums.

The FIU recognises the vital importance of national and international cooperation in the fight against money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF). Partnerships and information sharing between different jurisdictions and entities are crucial to dismantling illicit networks and ensuring the integrity of the global financial system.

4.2. Memoranda of Understanding and Exchange of Information


FIUs often operate in a global context, where financial crimes transcend borders.

MOUs facilitate co-operation between different countries, enabling FIUs to share relevant information on suspicious activity and financial crime trends, speeding up investigations and allowing crucial data to be accessed quickly.

The memorandums establish common guidelines and standards for information exchange, and help harmonise practices between different jurisdictions. They also include provisions for training and capacity building, allowing for the enhancement of skills and knowledge in specific areas.

Accordingly, below is a figure illustrating the universe of FIU MOUs. In accordance with the provisions of Article 9(o), Article 18(d) and (e) and Article 26 of Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January, the FIU must promote the establishment of Memoranda of Understanding and cooperate with international authorities, Financial Intelligence Units or similar bodies.

The following globe shows the countries with which Angola has signed co-operation agreements by signing Memoranda of Understanding and Exchanges of Information.



The UIF has reiterated its commitment to the cause of cooperation with its counterparts in various countries. The table below shows the dates on which the UIF signed agreements of understanding:

N.º	Country	Data
1	South Africa	24/11/14
2	Botswana	27/03/15
3	Brazil	30/06/13
4	Burundi	27/03/23
5	Cape Verde	19/04/13
6	China	19/06/18
7	Congo Brazzaville	01/09/18
8	Ethiopia	25/03/15
9	United Arab Emirates	04/07/23
10	Gambia	04/07/18
11	Ghana	30/01/19
12	Guiné-Bissau	19/06/17
13	Holland	04/07/19
14	Japan	30/01/19
15	Kenya	27/03/15
16	Lesotho	24/03/15
17	Madagascar	06/09/18
18	Malawi	27/03/17
19	Mauritius	10/04/19
20	Mozambique	10/04/13
21	Namibia	16/12/11
22	Nigeria	30/01/15
23	Portugal	25/07/12
24	Democratic Republic of the Congo	31/05/23
25	Rwanda	08/09/23
26	Russia	30/01/19
27	Sao Tome and Principe	20/02/14
28	Seychelles	03/09/13
29	Swazilândia	25/03/15
30	Tanzania	Sem data
31	East Timor	21/11/18
32	Uganda	24/03/15
33	Zambia	25/03/15
34	Zimbabwe	29/08/14

To this end, in 2024 the FIU carried out study visits to other Financial Intelligence Units to exchange experiences and provide technical assistance in preventing and combating ML/TF/PF, as shown below:


- Study visit and exchange of experience with the UIF of Zambia, held from 14 to 19 June 2024, in Luanda, Angola;
- Study visit to the UIF of Madagascar (SAMIFIN) as part of the sponsorship to join the EGMONT Group, held from 07 to 15 December 2024.



Under the heading of relations with national institutions, in order to establish specific guidelines for collaboration between the FIU and the various organisations, as well as promoting the exchange of information and assistance in investigations, the FIU has a total of 28 cooperation and information exchange protocols, and in the year under review it added 3 more with the following institutions:



National Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG)
Signed on 15 February 2024.



Ministry of Social Action, Family and Promotion of Women (MASFAMU)
Signed on 25 March 2024.




Supreme Court
Signed on 15 February 2024.

N.º	Institution	Data
1	General Tax Administration	January 08, 2020
2	National Private Investment Agency	March 18, 2013
3	Regulation and Supervision Agency and Insurance	February 15, 2012
4	National Bank of Angola	May 22, 2012
5	Capital Markets Commission	December 14, 2012
6	General Inspectorate of State Administration	May 19, 2021
7	National Housing Institute	May 18, 2013
8	Institute for the Promotion and Coordination of Aid to Communities	February 09, 2017
9	Gaming Supervision Institute	April 14, 2013
10	Ministry of Geology and Mines	January 14, 2013
11	Ministry of Finance	----
12	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights	July 27, 2012
13	Ministry of the Interior	----
14	Ministry of Commerce	August 09, 2013
15	Angolan Bar Association	March 16, 2015
16	Order of Accountants and Accounting Experts of Angola	January 24, 2020
17	Attorney General's Office	May 14, 2015
18	Criminal Investigation Service/DNIC - National Directorate of Criminal Investigation	-----
19	Criminal Investigation Service/DNIAE - National Directorate of Inspection of Economic Activities	July 30, 2012
20	Criminal Investigation Service	August 15, 2013
21	State Intelligence and Security Service	19 March 2012
22	Migration and Foreigners Service	March 11, 2013
23	National Public Procurement Service	March 30, 2019
24	Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid/ Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration	March 20, 2013
25	Customs Tax Police	August 25, 2023
26	National Agency of Oil, Gas and Biofuels	15 February 2024
27	Ministry of Social Action, Family and Promotion of Women	March 25, 2024
28	Supreme Court	May 29, 2024


4.3. Statistics on requests for information

In terms of statistics and requests for information in 2024, the UIF received a total of 4 requests for information from its counterparts and 279 from national institutions. In turn, it requested 48 requests for information from its national institutions and received 16 requests for information from international institutions, as shown in the table and chart.

Number of National Enquiries	2021	2022	2023	2024
Received	35	39	154	279
Sent	136	65	50	48



Number of International Enquiries	2021	2022	2023	2024
Received	10	7	5	4
Sent	8	7	8	16



4.4. Map of Requests by Country

The requests for information received by the FIU play a crucial role in the process of international cooperation, especially in the context of mutual legal assistance between counterparts, law enforcement authorities and judicial authorities between countries, improving the quality of financial intelligence produced in the investigation of suspected money laundering activities. Given the complexity of the crimes, as well as the fact that the activities transcend borders, international cooperation fosters a collaborative environment that facilitates the exchange of information.

In 2024, Angola received a total of 4 requests for information, as shown in the map below.

Country	Total
United Arab Emirates	1
Israel	1
Portugal	1
São Tomé	1



4.5. Participation of the Republic of Angola in the Mutual Evaluation of the Republic of Eritrea

As part of the Mutual Evaluation of ESAAMLG member countries, Angola had the Republic of Eritrea as an evaluator, represented by a UIF employee, who assessed the use of Financial Intelligence (immediate result 6) and assets recovered and confiscated (immediate result 8).

The process began in January 2024, with the on-site visit (interviews with institutions in the BC-FT-FP system) taking place in July of the same year, and the face-to-face (conformation of the facts) in December. The Eritrean Mutual Evaluation report will be presented in April 2025 in Kampala, Uganda.

As a member of the ESAAMLG, the UIF is taking another step towards strengthening regional cooperation, promoting transparency, integrity and sustainable development in our region.

4.6. Egmont Group Working Group Meeting

As a member of the Egmont Group, at the end of January and beginning of February 2024, the UIF was in the Republic of Malta represented by the Director General and an employee from the Information Technology Department, and they took part in a meeting with a working group of more than 300 representatives.

At this meeting, the members approved the proposal for shared updates and registers via the ESW. The proposal was successful and the process for the next package of updates to the ESWLine Structure platform was recommended. Thus, the Project Team proposed the updates, the exploratory phase for the next package of technical improvements and the launch of the new ESW within its configuration, security, policy, governance, budget and IT operating

models.

On the other hand, during the meetings other issues of great relevance were raised, having to do with the multilateral approach to combating illegal trade in wild species with the United for Wildlife, in which the next steps were mentioned for the implementation of the actions that needed to be taken and which are being dealt with at the highest level of the ESAAMLG.

4.7. 30th Egmont Group Plenary Meeting

Held in Paris in June, the 30th Plenary Meeting of the Egomnt Group brought together more than 400 participants, including members of the FIU groups, observers and international experts in the field of CB/TCF/PF.

As a member of the Egomnt Group, the Financial Intelligence Unit was represented by the Director General and a representative of the Analysis and Typologies Department.

During the meetings, key issues were addressed under the theme of the 'next generation FIU'. This proposal aimed to facilitate a prospective analysis of the adaptations required by FIUs over the next decade.

This theme reflected global efforts to adapt to future challenges, while fully embracing digital and environmental transitions with a focus on the following points):

- Workforce Development in the Future;
- The use of technology;
- Our role in tackling emerging types of crime;
- New ESW implementations.

At the same event, UNODC gave a presentation on Illegal Mining and Related IFFs, including the following: Laundering of Mineral Products - Related Crimes, Use of Minerals as a tool/ currency, Conflict Minerals, etc.

In addition, UNODC also mentioned the ongoing project called 'a global project' that aims to combat illicit financial flows related to Illegal Mining, Trafficking and Trade in Metals and

Precious Stones.

This project promotes collaboration at international, regional and national level to address the different issues identified above.

4.8. Other meetings

During 2024, other activities were carried out, such as updating the EBC (Egmont Biennial Census), which consists of providing better support to members so that the FIUs can engage in an effective exchange of information (of high quality, comprehensive and timely).

On the other hand, other important work was also carried out in the different working groups, with emphasis on the development of BECA Book III, 2024 edition, which contains the best cases related to money laundering and associated crimes, as well as terrorist financing. The cases in BECA Book III are the result of a competition for the best BECAs of recent years, culminating in the presentation and publication of 78 cases covering the years 2021 to 2023.

"The publication of this 2021–2023 BECA Case Award book is a significant milestone. It offers readers a comprehensive view of the evolution of money laundering and terrorist financing typologies and predicate offenses through the lens of 24 diverse cases from jurisdictions worldwide. This compilation is an important resource for our community, presenting real-world scenarios where cooperation among FIUs was pivotal in achieving results. It encapsulates the essence of the Egmont Group of FIUs."

4.9. ESAAMLG Senior Experts Meeting

The ESAAMLG held its 47th Plenary of Senior Experts from 5 to 12 April 2024 in the city of Lubango, Huíla province. The Plenary was preceded by a series of meetings of the Review Groups established to Assess the Post-Assessment Implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards in ESAAMLG member countries, as well as other meetings of specialised groups.

His Excellency José de Lima Massano, Minister of State for Economic Coordination, gave the opening speech at the plenary session.

Delegates engaged in diverse discussions and exchanged valuable insights on best practices, capacity building and strategies to improve the effectiveness of PC-BC/FT/FP measures in the region, with topics related to the Risk, Trends and Methods Group (RTMG), Technical Assistance and Training Coordination, the FIU Forum, the Risk, Compliance and Financial Inclusion (RCFI) Working Group, the Budget, Finance and Audit Committee, as well as restricted sessions of the Heads of Delegations and the ESAAMLG Steering Committee.

This event brought together regional experts and representatives from the public and private sectors to discuss crucial issues related to Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Financing Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (PC-BC/FT/FP) in the Southern and Eastern Africa region.

The event brought together more than 800 delegates from the region's 21 member countries, as well as representatives from cooperating and supporting nations and organisations, including Portugal, the UK, the USA, the COWWMESA Secretariat, the FATF Secretariat, GIZ, the IMF, the UN FAST Initiative, UNODC and the SADC Secretariat, among others.

On that occasion, the Group of Senior Experts discussed and approved the Report of the 2nd Round of Mutual Evaluation of the Republic of Rwanda, and also considered the first progress report of the Republic of Angola.





CHAPTER - V
National
Coordination

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5.1. National Coordination

With the publication of Angola's Mutual Evaluation Report in June 2023, and taking into account the set of strategic deficiencies identified in the National PC-BC/FT/FP System, and considering, among other things, the criteria of national GDP, the number of legal shortcomings and the classification of our effectiveness in meeting the requirements of countries subject to ICRG monitoring, with a view to strengthening the system and reducing the strategic deficiencies pointed out in the national system.

After the end of the observation period, the National Task Force travelled to Brussels, in the Kingdom of Belgium, from 2 to 13 September, to defend the Post-Observation Period Progress Report (POPR) at the FATF Joint Group for Africa, whose meeting was held on 5 September, during which all the progress made during the observation period was defended.

This discussion focused on the Post-Observation Period Progress Report that the Angolan authorities submitted to the ICRG Joint Group for Africa, which contained a set of strategic deficiencies that the Angolan state had to overcome over the course of a year, i.e. from 4 July 2023 to 4 July 2024.

The main actions carried out are presented below:

N.º	Main Actions Developed
1	Preparation of the Action Plans of the Institutions that make up the PC – ML/FT/FP system. (16 institutions)
2	Request for Assistance to the American FATF Reviewer on the Compliance of Law 1/12 on the Designation and Execution of International Legal Acts.
3	Request for Cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Mozambique.
4	Held a Consultation Meeting with the World Bank's Angola focal point for the start of the National Risk Assessment of ML/TF/FP.
5	Working Meeting with Financial, Non-Financial and Law Enforcement Sector to Monitor Action Plan Actions.
6	Elaboration of the Program and realization of the Sectoral and Thematic Risk Assessment Training for the institutions that are part of the ML-FT-FP system.
7	Elaboration of the Publication and Awareness Program on Thematic Evaluation of Cross-border Movements and Virtual Assets.
8	Working meeting with the Global Facility on the finalization of the Assessment of Legal Persons and Beneficial Owner.
9	Preparation of an AML-CFT Compliance Guide for the Non-Financial Sector.
10	Entered into an agreement with SecFin - Africa for technical assistance in: <div><div>1. National Risk Assessment with World Bank methodology;</div><div>2. Sectoral Risk Assessment of APNFD (ANIESA, INH, OAA, OCPCA); and,</div><div>3. Practical training in ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions.</div></div>
11	Signed an agreement with the Commission for the Coordination of Policies for the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing of Portugal for technical assistance in: <div><div>• Exchange of experiences between law enforcement agencies;</div><div>• Operational cooperation at the level of some sectors identified by Angola as having greater weaknesses in the PC-ML/TF/FP system.</div></div>
12	Coordinated meetings with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to analyze the proposal for a Beneficial Ownership Law.

With Angola's inclusion on the Enhanced Monitoring List, and consequently the approval of the Action Plan with a set of 17 actions for the Angolan state to reverse the current framework for preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

proposed by the International Co-operation and Review Group (ICRG) for Africa, the Angolan Executive initialled its High Level Commitment, in which it expresses its full commitment to the complete implementation of the Action Plan outlined by the ICRG/GAFI.

For this reason, the Supervisory Committee, as the body responsible for, among other things, defining and proposing to the Head of the Executive Branch the general and strategic guidelines and priorities for the Republic of Angola within the scope of the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, approved the country's Action Plan to overcome the shortcomings identified and contained in the FATF action plan.

Since October 2024, the institutions that make up the system have been implementing actions to improve the framework.

5.1.1. Approval of New Laws and Regulations

The revision of the legislative package on money laundering and terrorist financing is a process resulting from the need to adjust our laws to FATF standards, as a result of Angola's Mutual Evaluation process in which deficiencies in technical compliance were found.

As such, the Financial Intelligence Unit was directly involved in the legislative amendment process, together with the technical working group of the National Task Force coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.

The necessary conformity of the national legal framework for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the FATF Recommendations provides important support for overcoming the deficiencies pointed out in Angola's Mutual Evaluation Report, thus consolidating an important step in adjusting and strengthening the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction required for that observation period.

As a result of the changes made in this process, the legislation listed below is now in force:

N.º	Proposal	Alteration
1	Law No. 13/15, of 19 June, Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Penal Code.	Law No. 10/24, of 3 July - Law amending Law No. 13/15, of 19 June, Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Penal Code.
2	Law No. 19/17, 25 August, Law on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.	Law No. 09/24, July 3 - Law amending Law No. 19/17, August 25, on Preventing and Combating Terrorism.
3	Law No. 5/20, of 27 January – Law on Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.	Law No. 11/24, of July 4 – Law that Amends Law No. 5/20, of January 27, on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.



CHAPTER - VI

Awareness Raising, Workshops and Training

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6.1. Training Activities

In this area of training, the Financial Intelligence Unit has benefited from various training activities, both nationally and internationally, promoting a better understanding and training of national staff in matters of preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (PC-BC/FT/FP).

Several institutions co-operate with the Financial Intelligence Unit in this regard, namely the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Egmont Group, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), GLOBAL FACILITY, the Eastern, Southern Central Africa and Yemem Group (ESCAY), the United States Embassy in Angola and others.

It should be noted that the Financial Information Unit also organised workshops and training sessions, which were attended by numerous national institutions and organisations that are part of the System for Preventing and Combating ML/TF/MF, including:

N.º	Institutions
1	General Tax Administration (AGT)
2	National Food Safety and Inspection Authority (ANIESA)
3	Regulation and Supervision and Insurance Agency (ARSEG)
4	National Bank of Angola (BNA)
5	Capital Markets Commission (CMC)
6	National Housing Institute (INH)
7	Institute for Gambling Supervision (ISJ)
8	Ministry of Finance (MINFIN)
9	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MINJUSDH)
10	Ministério do Interior (MINTNT)
11	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX)
12	Angolan Bar Association (OA)
13	Order of Accountants and Accountants of Angola (OCPCA)
14	Attorney General's Office (PGR)
15	Criminal Investigation Service (SIC)
16	Migration and Foreigners Service (SME)
17	Customs Tax Police (PFA)
18	Ministry of Social Action, Family and Promotion of Women (MASFAMU)
19	Supreme Court (SC)
20	Private Sector Bodies (Banking, Gaming House, Securities Brokers, Real Estate Companies, NGOs and Insurance Companies)

Theme	Date of Realization	Promoted by	Easytobook Traveller
Training on Beneficial Ownership Risk Assessment;	14/05/24	Global Facility	UIF
	17/05/24		
Iº Workshop on the Implementation of Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment in the NGO Sector;	09/05/24	Global Facility	UIF
	10/05/24		
Technical Assistance on Completing the Progress Report After Observation Period;	15/05/24	ESAAMLG	UIF
	18/05/24		
Training for economic agents Rocha Monteiro and Bienne within the scope of ML/FT/FP	06/06/24	UIF	---
1st Meeting between the public and private sector on risk-based supervision	17/06/24		
Workshop on how to strengthen public-private cooperation	06/11/24	UNODC	UIF
Training on Risk Assessment.	06/11/24	UIF	---
	27/11/24		

6.2. Workshops and Seminars

The Financial Intelligence Unit is the central body responsible for coordinating and implementing policies to prevent and combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at national level.

Thus, as part of its duties to raise awareness among supervisory and inspection authorities on issues relating to compliance with obligations, as provided for in Article 6(j) and (l) of Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January, a total of seven (7) awareness and training workshops were held in 2024, namely:

- Huambo - July 09, 2024;
- Bié - July 12, 2024;
- Uíge - July 25, 2024;
- Huíla - October 04, 2024;
- Lunda Sul - October 11, 2024;
- Cabinda - November 08, 2024; and,
- Cuanza Sul - November 14, 2024.

Infographics no. 23




6.3. Awareness Raising, Workshops and Training

Infographics no.24


Participants:

**881**


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
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
Graph of Participants by Total Province:



Graph of the Gender Ratio by Province:



Number of Votes – Degree of Satisfaction



As set out in Article 18(3)(h)(i) and (k) of Decree 2/18, the aim of drawing up and promoting education and awareness programmes (ML/TF/MTF) among all the entities involved in the national system for preventing and combating ML/TF/MTF is to educate this same public on matters relating to money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promoting stocktaking studies capable of measuring the effectiveness of these programmes and the need for improvement.

These awareness-raising and training campaigns aim to promote the exchange of experiences between the relevant national authorities, with the participation of various institutions, such as:

- Supreme Court (TS);
- Attorney General's Office (PGR);
- Criminal Investigation Service (SIC);
- Customs Tax Police (PFA);
- Migration and Foreigners Service (SME);
- General Tax Administration (AGT);
- Angolan Bar Association (OAA);
- Order of Accountants and Accounting Experts of Angola (OCPCA);
- Defence and Security Agencies;
- Commercial Banks.



CHAPTER -VII

UIF's Strategic Vision

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
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7.1. Strategic Pillars

The year 2024 represented the second effective year of implementation of the Financial Information Unit's Strategic Plan, which was approved in 2023 for fulfilment in the four-year period ending in 2027. The aim of this plan is not only to respond to the internal demands of the FIU, with a view to optimising internal processes in the pursuit of achieving organisational excellence, reinforcing the corporate governance model, strengthening the institution's image and integrity, but also to respond to the main needs that will strengthen the National System for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this particular regard, in the course of 2024, the strategy was to define objectives in an attempt to respond to the POPR Action Plan, thereby seeking to remedy the shortcomings highlighted in Angola's Mutual Evaluation Report in order to achieve compliance with the recommendations of the International Action Group (FATF).

The strategic pillars are:

Infographics no. 25





7.2. Composition of the Strategic Pillars

The strategic pillars were structured to respond to the following elements:

- Reorganisation of the FIU;
- FATF Recommendations; and,
- National Strategy and General Lines of the Action Plan for PC-BC/FT/FP.

Strategic Pillars	No. of Strategic Objectives	No. of Strategic Initiatives	Action Plans	National Strategy and Broad Lines of the Action Plan 2023-2027	40 FATF Recommendations
Strategic Pillar No. 01	7	15	22	Measure 3 of Pillar 1 - Institutional Coordination and Cooperation	Recommendation 1 – Risk assessment and implementation of a risk-based approach
					Recommendation 29 - Financial Intelligence Units
Strategic Pillar No. 02	2	9	15	Pillar 3 - Capacity Building and Awareness	Instant result 6, Recommendation 29 - Financial intelligence units
Strategic Pillar No. 03	3	11	23	Point 1 of Objective 3 of Pillar 3 - Capacity Building and Awareness	Recommendation 15 - New technologies
					Instant result 6, Recommendation 29 - Financial intelligence units
Pillar Strategic No. 04	2	7	17	Point 1 of Objective 3 of Pillar 3 - Capacity Building and Awareness	Recommendation No. 02 - National Cooperation and Coordination
				Pillar 4 - Strengthening cooperation on CP-ML/CFT/PF and information sharing	Recommendation 40 - Other forms of international cooperation
Pillar Strategic No. 05	4	10	17	Pillar 1 - Institutional cooperation and cooperation	Recommendation No. 37 - Mutual Legal Assistance
				Pillar 2 - Regulation and supervision	
				Pillar 5 - Investigation, prosecution and asset recovery	

7.3. Summary of Strategic Objectives

The main actions carried out in 2024 under the strategic plan are described in the map below:

Strategic Pillars	Strategic Objectives / Actions	State
Strategic Pillar N° 01	1.1. Ensure the approval of the internal rules of operation of the Directorate-General of the FIU	Implemented
	1.2. Ensure budgetary and procurement control and assess the operating costs of the FIU	Implemented
	1.3. Define and implement policies and regulations aimed at reinforcing the Corporate Governance model	Implemented
	1.4. Implement the Methodology for Evaluating the Mid-Term Performance of the Organic Units	Implemented
Strategic Pillar N° 02	2.1. Strengthen Human Capital in organic units	Implemented
	2.2. Ensure a human capital development programme	Implemented
	2.3. Implement UIF human capital policies	Implemented
	2.4. Define and implement UIF Role Descriptions	Implemented
	2.5. Implement training policy	Implemented
	2.6. Establishing agreements with training institutions	Implemented
	2.7. Define a program to strengthen organizational culture	Implemented
	2.8. Define and implement a program for organizational change management	Implemented
	2.9. Implement health, hygiene and safety measures at work.	Partially Implemented
Strategic Pillar N° 03	3.1. Implement emergency measures	Partially Implemented
	3.2. Define an information systems strategic plan	Implemented
Strategic Pillar N° 04	4.1. Strengthen the FIU's relationship with similar units and relevant international organizations on the subject	Implemented
	4.2. Improve the image and improve the methodology of institutional communication	Implemented
	4.3. Strengthen coordination, cooperation and dialogue with other institutions	Implemented
	4.4. Memoranda of Understanding	
Strategic Pillar N° 05	5.1. Ensure compliance with the recommendations resulting from the SRM, approved in plenary	Partially implemented
	5.2. Ensure the implementation of revision initiatives for the regulatory framework of the PC-BC-FT-FP system	Implemented
	5.3. Ensure the legal compliance of the standards produced in-house	Implemented
	5.4. Study and develop proposals regarding the approach of emerging threats, vulnerabilities and typologies of terrorism and terrorist financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Implemented
	5.5. Coordinate the entities involved in the national PC-BC/FT/PF system, aiming to implement the measures in force in the National Strategy	Implemented
	5.6. Strengthening the PC-BC/FT/FP regulatory framework	Partially Implemented
	5.7. Enhance the mechanism of collecting, analyzing, producing intelligence from designated persons	Partially implemented
	5.8. Promote periodic alignment meetings with Law Enforcement Agencies to assess the level of quality of intelligence and information exchange between entities	Implemented
	5.9. Diagnosis of the current situation regarding GoAML	Implemented
	5.10. Raise awareness about the importance of using GoAML	Implemented
	5.11. Develop, implement and monitor an action plan to ensure compliance with FATF recommendations	Implemented
	5.12. Create a joint work plan to prevent and combat transnational crimes, aiming to implement the measures in force in the National Strategy	Partially Implemented



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Annexes

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8.1. References

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- Organic statute of the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Supervisory Committee.

Law 5/20, of 27 January:

- Law on preventing and combating money laundering, terrorist financing and financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Presidential Decree 73/23, March:

- National strategy and general guidelines for the plan to prevent and combat ML/TF/MF.

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8.2. Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANIESA	- National Inspection Authority
ANR	- National Risk Assessment
APNFD	- Designated Non-Financial Professionals and Activities
BC/FT/FP	- Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
BO	- Beneficial Ownership
CDD	- Costumer Due Diligence
CE	- Spontaneous Communications
DIPD	- Spontaneous Communications
DNIRH	- National Directorate for Identification and Notarial Records
DOS	- Declaration of Suspicious Operation
DTM- X-BORDER	- Declarations of Cross-Border Movements
DTN	- Cash Transaction Declaration
ESAAMLG	- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
FMI	- International Monetary Fund
FT	- Terrorist Financing
FATF	- Financial Action Task Force
GoAML	- IT solution developed by UNODC specifically for Financial Intelligence Units
GTPE	- Working Group to Support the Implementation of the Strategic Plan
ICRG	- <i>International cooperation review group</i> (FATF)
INH	- National Housing Institute
MASFAMU	- MMinistry of Social Action, Family and Promotion of Women
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
PC-BC/FT/FP	-Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, Financing Terrorism and Financing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
PGR	- Attorney General's Office
POPR	- Post Observation Period Report
VASP	- Virtual Asset Service Providers
RAM	- Mutual Evaluation Report
SADC	- Southern African Development
SIC	- Criminal Investigation Service
TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE	- Technical Compliance
UIF	- Financial Information Unit
IO	- <i>Immediate Outcome</i>
MER	- <i>Mutual Evaluation Reports</i>
UNODC	- <i>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</i>
GTPE	- Technical Support Group for the Strategic Plan



8.3. Infographics

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